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A good many non-musicians look bewildered when I tell them I am a musicologist as 
well as a performer, wondering what on earth a ‘musicologist’ is. I usually answer by 
saying something like ‘I am also engaged in critical historical study of music and 
music-making’, aware that this is far from being an exhaustive definition of the range 
of activity encompassed by musicology. Some musicologists are engaged primarily in 
highly technical analysis, others do fieldwork, some spend long periods in detailed 
study of old manuscripts, others investigate non-Western musical cultures, 
philosophies of and strategies for musical education, the psychology of music, and so 
on; my own work concentrates on document-based historical study, some analysis, 
sketch study, lots of historical contextualisation, ideology critique, performance 
practice, and in general a wide range of music and music-making from the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, focusing not least upon the institutions of music (including 
educational institutions) as well as musicians. 
But, whilst many people would understand the difference between the critical study of 
literature such as one might undertake in an English degree, and a course in Creative 
Writing, designed to help students develop their skills for becoming a writer, the 
equivalent distinction is insufficiently understood and appreciated for music. This can 
be a major issue with prospective students and their parents, who imagine that a music 
degree is essentially a vocational qualification in order to become a professional 
musician. Unfortunately only a small minority of those who go through the advanced 
professional training provided by conservatoires succeed towards this end; the 
chances for those who go to university are correspondingly less. 
Much can be said about the wider benefits of a music degree, the range of transferable 
skills it can entail, which not only prepares students well for many fields of life in 
which they might work, but also opens up an enriching outlook on culture and society 
in general. But this relates to a much wider conception of the study of the subject than 
would be involved in a more narrowly vocational degree, and in particular to the role 
of musicology. 
Many musical practitioners (performers and composers) are sceptical or even 
downright hostile to musicology as a discipline with a degree of autonomy, seeing it 
as of secondary importance compared to the acts of making or producing music. 
Certainly as a formalised academic subject, dating from the mid-nineteenth century in 
the German-speaking world, musicology is very young compared to practical musical 
activity, though wider thinking and writing about music can be dated back a lot 
further. As long as human beings communicate with one another about music, then 
some verbal discourses are established; musicology attempts to find ways to develop 
these discourses into something employing more rigorous and self-critical methods 
for arriving at conclusions. 
Not all of those who listen to or take an interest in music are necessarily involved in 
producing it, any more than all readers are professional writers, or viewers of art are 
themselves artists (I personally have interests in a wide range of visual art, but my 
abilities to produce anything of the type are practically zero). And the priorities of 
those interested in music might be quite different to those who have a professional 
stake in certain outcomes. In this context the intermediary role of the critic can be 
important – bridging the intentions and desires of the producers with the wishes and 
requirements of the consumers, whether reviewing concerts or restaurants. In the case 
of reviews of atonal contemporary music, this relationship can become fraught, 
depending upon the target readership; a critic writing mostly for an audience already 
likely to be broadly sympathetic (such as the readership of a specialist new music 
journal) has a different task from one writing for an audience whose sympathy might 
be highly selective, or may even be actively hostile to such music, and are reading this 
critic for advice on what they might listen to. This latter type of critic would in some 
sense be failing their readers if they simply reiterated composers’ own perception of 
their work with no consideration as to how it might be perceived by someone who 
does not necessarily share all of those composers’ assumptions and priorities. 
When considering historical composers, there are many obvious ways in which 
listeners may also approach the music in question in ways very different from those of 
the composers (or others from the time). One does not have to be a strict Lutheran to 
appreciate Bach, nor necessarily accept some of the theological motivations proffered 
for some of the musical decisions. An atheist would believe these were a delusion or 
at least a fiction, and might consider them as the expression of some wider human 
issues. A similar situation can apply to the tropes of heroism which inform some of 
Beethoven’s mid-period work (and a good deal of subsequent reception), or more 
ominously the anti-semitic views expressed by Wagner in his 1850 article ‘Das 
Judenthum in der Musik’; much work has been done considering the question of the 
extent to which these views, and other common anti-semitic views of the time, might 
have informed some of the characterisations in his music-dramas, and been 
understood as such by audiences of the time. If one concludes that this might indeed 
have been the case, this does not require automatic rejection of the work, but can 
facilitate an engagement with the music-dramas not simply as art works existing 
outside of time and place, but ones which reflect a particular set of ideologies of the 
time, held by the composer, which a reasonable person would today reject without 
necessarily rejecting all cultural work which sprang up in a context where they were 
indeed acceptable. Similar positions are possible with respect to representations of 
women, of characters from outside of the Western world, in musical works involving 
theatre or text; on a deeper level it is also possible to consider the ways in which 
abstract instrumental music might itself have grown out of texted/stage work and 
inherited some of the oppositions between musical materials (especially as had 
become codified to represent masculine and feminine characters) which were intrinsic 
to the latter. 
In all of these cases, the approach of the writer or listener amounts to something 
different from simply reiterating the composer’s intentions and wishes, or at least 
applying a different set of valorising standards to them. When applied with sufficient 
care for proper and balanced investigation of factual evidence (with proper 
referencing), rigour and transparency of argument, and elegance of presentation, not 
to mention some commitment to producing an argument which does more than simply 
reiterate that of numerous previous writers, this constitutes one variety of critical 
musicology. Not all or even most such work need arrive at negative conclusions, and 
some might affirm existing perceptions, but it does so as a result of serious 
consideration of alternative possibilities, rather than simply declaring them off-limits 
from the outset. 
To some extent, I believe the value of this type of work is more widely accepted than 
it would have been several decades ago. The situation might be different with other 
forms of critical investigation, such as examination of the cult of artistic genius, the 
privileging of particular forms of music (orchestral, chamber) over others (opera, 
some solo music) on grounds of apparent ‘depth’ and ‘substance’, or for that matter 
the devaluation of some popular music or musical forms rooted in practices from 
minority groups as compared to a Western art music tradition, taking on board the 
associated assumptions and ideologies upon which such positions are founded. All of 
this involves countenancing the notion that music, music-making and musical 
reception may not be ideologically neutral fields belong to the realms of ‘pure art’, 
but might themselves reflect and reflect back upon wider social perceptions. 
But the situation is more contested in the field of contemporary classical music. This 
is itself a field in which many practitioners feel themselves to be marginalised, with 
very little music of an atonal nature having won any degree of widespread public 
acceptance (even to the extent of that of composers such as Stravinsky, Britten or 
Shostakovich). Yet there are musicological critiques of some of this body of work 
emerging from people other than conservative classical music listeners. A body of 
work by various scholars associated with the ‘new musicology’ has contested the 
claims for primacy of various avant-garde music, drawing attention to what is argued 
to be its elitism, individualism (maintaining a nineteenth-century focus upon the 
‘great composer’), abstraction and consequent social disengagement, white male 
middle-class bias, and artificial institutionalisation (including institutionalisation in 
higher education) despite its being a small minority interest. This latter point is 
extremely charged considering that some such musicologists inhabit university 
departments which they will share with some of the practitioners said to benefit from 
such institutional privilege. 
As both a practitioner (as an active performer) and a musicologist, I was naturally 
somewhat thrown when first spending serious time with this body of work in the early 
2000s. At first I was hostile, as it seemed simply another nail in the coffin of the type 
of avant-garde music I felt bound to defend. I began framing an extensive critique of 
several of the key writers concerned (to date unfinished but in a quite advanced state 
of development, which I will return to at some point), after realising the extent to 
which much of this work had become easily absorbed and was now little questioned 
within academia, despite sometimes being based upon major assumptions which I felt 
never to have been properly tested. But after spending a considerable amount of time 
reading the work in question, I felt myself forced to conclude that it did indeed raise 
many issues which could not be dismissed out of hand, however much these issues 
might be difficult for those of us intensely involved in the field being critiqued. From 
this point onwards I began to take a somewhat more sceptical attitude towards various 
aspects of the musical world in which I was most deeply involved as a practitioner, 
and especially became aware of conflicting priorities as a scholar and a performer, a 
conflict I have never wished to artificially elide. 
For those writing about contemporary composers and their work (of which I am one) 
this can create a very difficult situation. The work concerned is already deemed 
marginal, and the scholar can encounter distrust or even hostility if their own work 
takes a critical perspective. Such scholars value opportunities to speak and write about 
composers outside of the usual academic arenas, but many of these opportunities are 
determined by the composers in question; in several cases I know of these 
opportunities promptly being curtailed after the scholar in question dared to express 
an even mildly critical opinion about some aspect of the work of the composer in 
question. Perhaps as a result of this, a lot of scholarly work on new music has tended 
to be defensive or hagiographic – and I would include a good deal of the early writing 
on Boulez, Stockhausen and John Cage in this category, as well as some of the 
writing on Michael Finnissy by myself and others – or else simply outright hostile. 
Little middle ground exists between this ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ mentalities 
towards new music, though the situation is changing a little. The failure on the part of 
many actively involved with the composition and performance of new music to 
address the issues raised by new musicologists and others has allowed the sometimes 
simplistic arguments of the latter a free ride. 
In my own more recent work on Finnissy (which I have been revising and editing 
over the last months) this has been a continual concern. Finnissy can be most 
articulate about his own intentions and ideas behind certain works, but it ill behoves a 
scholar of integrity to simply reiterate these without asking any questions first. In his 
piece North American Spirituals, Finnissy finds ways of combining eighteenth-
century white American hymns with African-American spirituals, to make a comment 
about racism and racial tension. A brilliant idea (especially in the sophistication of its 
implementation), but to what extent does the sounding result necessarily communicate 
the latter to someone who has not been told what they are meant to be hearing and 
interpreting? And what are the wider implications of appropriating music borne of 
slavery into a concert hall environment generally populated by white middle class 
people? For reasons too detailed to explicate here, the view which I ultimately 
concluded was mostly affirmative of some of Finnissy’s positions, but not without 
attempting to consider how they might be interpreted quite differently. 
The ‘intentional fallacy’ (the fallacy of granting primacy to the intentions of an 
author) has been widely recognised as such in literature ever since the publication of 
W.K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks’ 1946 essay of the same name. But in much 
writing about new music, the composer’s intention remains almost sacrosanct, and 
some writing is judged better or worse by the extent to which it concurs with this. 
This is a very poor state of affairs compared to that appertaining to literature. The 
composer is an individual existing in a particular time and place, having inherited 
(and of course themselves mediated) a range of beliefs and ideologies, who is 
inevitably a flawed individual with their own set of interests, prejudices, perhaps petty 
jealousies, and so on, not the be-all and end-all of meaning in the way that is implied 
through a deferential attitude towards ‘great men’ (and the odd ‘great woman’). 
One can read any number of pieces of writing which will present the finest detail of 
compositional technique involved in creating a piece – in a duly ‘respectful’ manner – 
but when it comes to dealing with the sounding result, restrict themselves to a few 
choice adjectives of praise, saying little about what relationship exists between the 
means and the ends, let alone about why (or if) the final result might be capable of 
generating any type of meaningful response amongst listeners. This may not be 
entirely unwilled: to address the latter issue would involve asking difficult questions 
relating to the fact that much new music has never succeeded in gaining more than a 
very small audience relative to the totality of the listening population, and many of 
them have professional connections to the work concerned. That some artistic work is 
a small minority interest need not necessarily be cause for censure or dismissal, but to 
pretend that this is not the case, or continue with the far-from-proved assumption that 
simply a greater amount of promotion and publicity will generate these so-far elusive 
audiences, is simply naïve. 
At a round table discussion at a conference a few years ago on the symphony 
orchestra as cultural phenomenon, one musicologist opined that whilst it was all very 
well for such musicologists to look critically at these types of institutions, at a time 
when funding is in question this was the wrong thing to do, and we should all be 
putting our weight behind supporting them. But this would be a prime example of 
substituting propaganda for scholarship. In other contexts, musicologists may want to 
lend their names to campaigns to preserve state funding of symphony orchestras, but 
to censor critical scholarship for this reason is a betrayal of every principle upon 
which rational investigation is based. 
There are many ways in which legitimate criticisms can be made of a whole range of 
musicological work (some of which I intend to consider in some later posts on here); I 
personally would identify excessive use of jargon, sometimes to mask a paucity of 
any more incisive argument, and simply the production of work which seems intended 
primarily to satisfy a few other like-minded academics in a particular sub-field, with 
no real interest in whether it might have any wider impact. But the alternative to this 
is not simply for musicologists to line up to write what practising musicians want 
them to, and sacrifice any independent perspective in the process. 
Musicology should be properly valued as an independent discipline which enhances 
understanding of music, the role of music in different societies and cultures, 
approaches to performance, modes of listening, and much else. These ends are not 
served by its inhabiting a subservient position relative to practical music-making and 
producing material more akin to that one might expect from composers’ publishers or 
musicians’ agents. And the study of music can be an enhancing experience for a great 
many people, regardless of whether they go on to practise it professionally. 
 
